Text of S. Court Opinion - K-12 Educ for Illegals - Part 1

[TheChancellors]

.
PLYLER, SUPERINTENDENT, TYLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL. v. DOE, GUARDIAN, ET AL.

No. 80-1538

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

457 U.S. 202; 102 S. Ct. 2382; 72 L. Ed. 2d 786; 1982 U.S. LEXIS 124; 50 U.S.L.W. 4650

December 1, 1981, Argued
June 15, 1982, Decided *


* Together with No. 80-1934, Texas et al. v. Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children et al., also on appeal from the same court.

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Petition for Rehearing Denied September 9, 1982.

PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

DISPOSITION: No. 80-1538, 628 F.2d 448, and No. 80-1934, affirmed.

Case in Brief
Time-saving, comprehensive research tool. Includes expanded summary, extensive research and analysis, and links to LexisNexis® content and available court documents.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant school districts sought review of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that the revision of the Texas Education Code, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031, that permitted local school districts to deny enrollment in public schools to plaintiffs, undocumented children, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

OVERVIEW: The Texas Legislature revised its education laws, Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031, to authorize local school districts to deny enrollment in public schools to children not legally admitted to the country. Plaintiffs, undocumented school-aged children, challenged the revision on equal protection grounds. In affirming the lower court's decision that the revision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim that illegal aliens were a suspect class. Unlike most of the classifications that had been recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, was the product of voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class was itself a crime. However, plaintiffs were not comparably situated. The protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to anyone, citizen or stranger, who was subject to the laws of a state. Furthermore, denial of an education to plaintiffs posed an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause, which was the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.

OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the decision, noting that if the state wished to deny plaintiffs, undocumented school-aged children, the free public education that it offered to other children residing within its borders, the denial was to be justified by a showing that it furthered some substantial state interest.

CORE TERMS: alien's, illegal aliens, classification, undocumented, immigration, resident, school districts, equal protection, public schools, public education, border, equal protection, fundamental right, federal laws, deportation, lawful, educational, lawfully, reside, suspect class, naturalization, immigration laws, tuition, entrant, permission, immigrant, residing, rational basis, resident aliens, right to vote

LEXISNEXIS® HEADNOTES Hide


Immigration Law > Enforcement > Criminal Offenses > Illegal Entry > General Overview

HN1 Unsanctioned entry into the United States is a crime under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1325. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Deportation & Removal


Immigration Law > Deportation & Removal > Grounds > Inadmissibility at Entry > General Overview

HN2 Immigrants who have entered unlawfully are subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251, 1252. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection


Immigration Law > Constitutional Foundations > Equal Protection


Immigration Law > Duties & Rights of Aliens > Education

HN3 The absolute deprivation of education should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute deprivation is the result of complete inability to pay for the desired benefit. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection


Immigration Law > Constitutional Foundations > Equal Protection

HN4 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection

HN5 Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States. No plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment jurisdiction can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > The Judiciary > Case or Controversy > Standing > General Overview


Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection


Immigration Law > Duties & Rights of Aliens > Legal Representation

HN6 All persons within the territory of the United States, including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke U.S. Const. amend. V and VI to challenge actions of the federal government. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Procedural Due Process > Scope of Protection

HN7 The term "person," used in U.S. Const. amend V, is broad enough to include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those laws. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection

HN8 The Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV directs that all persons in similar circumstances shall be treated alike. But so too, the Constitution does not require things that are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. The initial discretion to determine what is different and what is the same resides in the legislatures of the states. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the state to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, the classification must bear some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Level of Review


Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection

HN9 In determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, the court looks to the Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > General Overview

HN10 Public education is not a right granted to individuals by the Constitution. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > The Presidency > General Overview


Immigration Law > Constitutional Foundations > General Overview


International Law > Authority to Regulate > General Overview

HN11 The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection

HN12 The states enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens. This power is committed to the political branches of the federal government. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote


International Law > Sovereign States & Individuals > Citizenship

HN13 An illegal entry into the country would not, under traditional criteria, bar a person from obtaining domicile within a state. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote

Available Briefs and Other Documents Related to this Case:

Go to Supreme Court Briefs
Go to Supreme Court Briefs
Go to Oral Argument Transcript


LAWYERS' EDITION DISPLAY Hide

DECISION:

Texas statute withholding funds from local school districts for education of children not legally admitted into United States and authorizing districts to deny enrollment to such children, held to violate equal protection clause.

SUMMARY:

The Texas legislature enacted a statute which withholds from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States and which authorizes local school districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to such children. Constitutional challenges were made to the provisions by a number of parties. One case was a class action filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of certain school-aged children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County, Texas, who could not establish that they had been legally admitted into the United States, against the Superintendent and members of the Board of Trustees of the Tyler Independent School District, complaining of the exclusion of the plaintiff children from the public schools of the School District. After making extensive findings of fact, the District Court held that illegal aliens were entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Texas statute violated that clause (458 F Supp 569). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld an injunction issued by the District Court, affirming in all essential respects the equal protection analysis of the District Court, concluding that the Texas statute was constitutionally infirm regardless of whether it was tested using a more rational basis standard or some more stringent test (658 F2d 448). A number of other actions filed in Federal District Courts in Texas were consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation into a single action against state officials to be heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The District Court held that the Texas statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that the statute was not carefully tailored to advance the asserted state interest in an acceptable manner (501 F Supp 544), and, apparently on the strength of its earlier decision, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the decision of the District Court.

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In an opinion by Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., it was held that the Texas statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, neither the undocumented status of the alien children vel non, nor the state's asserted interest in the preservation of its limited resources for the education of its lawful residents furthering some substantial goal of the state in order to establish a sufficient rational basis for the discrimination contained in the statute.

Marshall, J., concurring, emphasized his belief that an individual's interest in education is fundamental and that a class-based denial of public education is utterly incompatible with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Blackmun, J., concurring, expressed his view that the nature of the interest at stake in the case was crucial to its proper resolution, that when a state provides an education to some and denies it to others it immediately and inevitably creates class distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent with the purposes of the equal protection clause, and that whatever the state's power to classify deportable aliens, the statute at issue swept within it a substantial number of children who would in fact, and who may well be entitled to, remain in the United States.

Powell, J., concurring, emphasized the unique character of the instant case and expressed his view that the state's denial of education to the children in the case bore no substantial relation to any substantial state interest.

Burger, Ch. J., joined by White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissented, expressing the view that the United States Supreme Court trespasses on the assigned function of the political branches under the stricture of limited and separate powers when it assumes a policymaking role as the court did in the case before it, and that the distinction that Texas had drawn was based not only upon its own legitimate interest but on classifications established by the federal government in its immigration laws and policies and was not unconstitutional.

LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:

[***LEdHN1]

LAW §364

equal protection -- undocumented aliens -- denial of public education to children of aliens --

Headnote:LEdHN[1A] [1A]LEdHN[1B] [1B]LEdHN[1C] [1C]LEdHN[1D] [1D]

A state statute which withholds from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who are not "legally admitted" into the United States and which authorizes local school districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to such children violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, neither the undocumented status of these children vel non nor the state's asserted interest in the preservation of its limited resources for the education of its lawful residents furthering some substantial goal of the state in order to establish a sufficient rational basis for the discrimination contained in the statute. (Burger, Ch. J., and White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., dissented from this holding.)

[***LEdHN2]

LAW §364

equal protection -- persons protected -- undocumented aliens --

Headnote:LEdHN[2] [2]

For purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause which prohibits states from denying equal protection to "any person within its jurisdiction," undocumented aliens, despite their immigration status, are persons "within the jurisdiction" of a state entitled to the equal protection of its law, use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" confirming that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a state, and reaches into every corner of a state's territory, and that until he leaves the jurisdiction, either voluntarily or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States, a person is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a state may choose to establish.

[***LEdHN3]

LAWS §346

equal protection -- due process -- applicability --

Headnote:LEdHN[3] [3]

The due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.

[***LEdHN4]

LAW §320

equal protection -- similar treatment of different things --

Headnote:LEdHN[4] [4]

The United States Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same; the initial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the legislatures of the states.

[***LEdHN5]

LAW §319

equal protection -- classifications -- legitimate public purpose --

Headnote:LEdHN[5] [5]

In applying the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to most forms of state action, the United States Supreme Court seeks only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.

[***LEdHN6]

LAW §322

equal protection -- denial of right -- application of strict scrutiny --

Headnote:LEdHN[6A] [6A]LEdHN[6B] [6B]

In determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause, the United States Supreme Court will look to the United States Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein.

[***LEdHN7]

LAW §318

equal protection -- invidious classifications -- demonstrating compelling governmental interest --

Headnote:LEdHN[7A] [7A]LEdHN[7B] [7B]

With respect to presumptively invidious classifications that disadvantage a suspect class or that impinge upon the exercise of a fundamental right, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the state to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest; in addition, certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties, in which circumstances assurance should be sought that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the state; only when concerns sufficiently absolute and enduring can be clearly ascertained from the Constitution and cases of the United States Supreme Court will the Supreme Court employ this latter standard to aid it in determining the rationality of the legislative choice.

[***LEdHN8]

LAW §364

equal protection -- illegal aliens -- suspect class --

Headnote:LEdHN[8A] [8A]LEdHN[8B] [8B]

Illegal aliens are not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.

[***LEdHN9]

ALIENS §24

state regulation --

Headnote:LEdHN[9A] [9A]LEdHN[9B] [9B]

No state may independently exercise a power like the plenary federal power to determine who has sufficiently manifested his allegiance to become a citizen of the nation, but if the federal government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be an appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the states may follow the federal direction.

[***LEdHN10]

CHILD §1

directing parent's misconduct to children --

Headnote:LEdHN[10] [10]

Legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice; visiting condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust, and imposing disabilities on the child is contrary to the basic concept that legal burden should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.

[***LEdHN11]

SCHOOLS §1

right to public education --

Headnote:LEdHN[11] [11]

Public education is not a right granted to individuals by the United States Constitution.

[***LEdHN12]

SCHOOLS §1

public education -- opportunity must be made available on equal terms --

Headnote:LEdHN[12] [12]

If a state has undertaken to provide the opportunity of an education, that opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

[***LEdHN13]

LAW §364

equal protection -- treatment of aliens -- congressional policy --

Headnote:LEdHN[13] [13]

Faced with an equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of aliens, courts must be attentive to congressional policy, as the exercise of congressional power might well affect the state's prerogatives to afford differential treatment to a particular class of aliens.

[***LEdHN14]

LAW §318

equal protection -- classification -- using federal classification --

Headnote:LEdHN[14] [14]

A state may borrow a federal classification, but to justify its use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy, the state must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably adapted to the purposes for which the state desires to use it.

[***LEdHN15]

LAW §349

equal protection -- treatment of nonresidents --

Headnote:LEdHN[15A] [15A]LEdHN[15B] [15B]

A state may not accomplish what would otherwise be prohibited by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment merely by defining a disfavored group as nonresident.



SYLLABUS


Held: A Texas statute which withholds from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorizes local school districts to deny enrollment to such children, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 210-230.

(a) The illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases challenging the statute may claim the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause, which provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term. This Court's prior cases recognizing that illegal aliens are "persons" protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which Clauses do not include the phrase "within its jurisdiction," cannot be distinguished on the asserted ground that persons who have entered the country illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within its boundaries and subject to its laws. Nor do the logic and history of the Fourteenth Amendment support such a construction. Instead, use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" confirms the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State's territory. Pp. 210-216.

(b) The discrimination contained in the Texas statute cannot be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State. Although undocumented resident aliens cannot be treated as a "suspect class," and although education is not a "fundamental right," so as to require the State to justify the statutory classification by showing that it serves a compelling governmental interest, nevertheless the Texas statute imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status. These children can neither affect their parents' conduct nor their own undocumented status. The deprivation of public education is not like the deprivation of some other governmental benefit. Public education has a pivotal role in maintaining the fabric of our society and in sustaining our political and cultural heritage; the deprivation of education takes an inestimable toll on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and poses an obstacle to individual achievement. In determining the rationality of the Texas statute, its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children may properly be considered. Pp. 216-224.

(c) The undocumented status of these children vel non does not establish a sufficient rational basis for denying them benefits that the State affords other residents. It is true that when faced with an equal protection challenge respecting a State's differential treatment of aliens, the courts must be attentive to congressional policy concerning aliens. But in the area of special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the legislative record, no national policy is perceived that might justify the State in denying these children an elementary education. Pp. 224-226.

(d) Texas' statutory classification cannot be sustained as furthering its interest in the "preservation of the state's limited resources for the education of its lawful residents." While the State might have an interest in mitigating potentially harsh economic effects from an influx of illegal immigrants, the Texas statute does not offer an effective method of dealing with the problem. Even assuming that the net impact of illegal aliens on the economy is negative, charging tuition to undocumented children constitutes an ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal immigration, at least when compared with the alternative of prohibiting employment of illegal aliens. Nor is there any merit to the suggestion that undocumented children are appropriately singled out for exclusion because of the special burdens they impose on the State's ability to provide high-quality public education. The record does not show that exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State. Neither is there any merit to the claim that undocumented children are appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence within the United States renders them less likely than other children to remain within the State's boundaries and to put their education to productive social or political use within the State. Pp. 227-230.

COUNSEL: John C. Hardy argued the cause for appellants in No. 80-1538. Richard Arnett, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellants in No. 80-1934. With them on the briefs were Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, and Richard E. Gray III, Executive Assistant Attorney General.

Peter D. Roos argued the cause for appellees in No. 80-1538. With him on the brief were Larry Daves and Vilma S. Martinez. Peter A. Schey argued the cause for appellees in No. 80-1934. With him on the briefs were Al Campos, Larry Mealer, and Jane Swanson.

Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, and Edwin S. Kneedler filed a brief for the United States in No. 80-1934 and for the United States as amicus curiae in No. 80-1538. +


+ Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both bases were filed by Travis Hiester, Orrin W. Johnson, Neal King, and Tony Martinez for the Harlingen Consolidated Independent School District et al.; and by John S. Aldridge for the Texas Association of School Boards. Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 80-1538.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed by James J. Orlow for the American Immigration Lawyers Association; by Samuel Rabinove for the American Jewish Committee; by Bill Lann Lee for the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund; by the Edgewood Independent School District; by Peter B. Sandmann for the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco; by Michael K. Suarez for the Mexican American Bar Association of Houston; by Robert J. Kenney, Jr., for the National Education Association et al.; by Fred Fuchs for Texas Impact; and by Daniel Marcus and John F. Cooney for the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. Thomas M. Griffin filed a brief for the California State Board of Education as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 80-1538.

Briefs of amici curiae in both cases were filed by Joseph C. Zengerle for the Federation for American Immigration Reform; by David Crump for the Legal Foundation of America; and by Roger J. Marzulla and Maxwell A. Miller for the Mountain States Legal Foundation.

Briefs of amici curiae in No. 80-1934 were filed by Joyce D. Miller for the American Friends Service Committee et al.; and by Gwendolyn H. Gregory, Thomas A. Shannon, and August W. Steinhilber for the National School Boards Association.



JUDGES: BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., post, p. 230, BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 231, and POWELL, J., post, p. 236, filed concurring opinions. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 242.

OPINION BY: BRENNAN


OPINION


[*205] [***791] [**2388] JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

[***LEdHR1A] LEdHN[1A] [1A]The question presented by these cases is whether, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas may deny to undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provides to children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens.

I

Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted immigration into this country. HN1 Unsanctioned entry into the United States [***792] is a crime, 8 U. S. C. § 1325, HN2 and those who have entered unlawfully are subject to deportation, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1251, 1252 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). But despite the existence of these legal restrictions, a substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering the United States, and now live within various States, including the State of Texas.

In May 1975, the Texas Legislature revised its education laws to withhold from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States. The 1975 revision also authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children not "legally admitted" to the country. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 1 These [**2389] cases involve constitutional challenges to those provisions.

FOOTNOTES

1 That section provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of September of any scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that year.

"(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission.

"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district."


[*206] No. 80-1538

Plyler v. Doe

This is a class action, filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in September 1977, on behalf of certain school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County, Tex., who could not establish that they had been legally admitted into the United States. The action complained of the exclusion of plaintiff children from the public schools of the Tyler Independent School District. 2 The Superintendent and members of the Board of Trustees of the School District were named as defendants; the State of Texas intervened as a party-defendant. After certifying a class consisting of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin residing within the School District, the District Court preliminarily enjoined defendants from denying a free education to members of the plaintiff class. In December [***793] 1977, the court conducted an extensive hearing on plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunctive relief.

FOOTNOTES

2 Despite the enactment of § 21.031 in 1975, the School District had continued to enroll undocumented children free of charge until the 1977-1978 school year. In July 1977, it adopted a policy requiring undocumented children to pay a "full tuition fee" in order to enroll. Section 21.031 had not provided a definition of "a legally admitted alien." Tyler offered the following clarification:

"A legally admitted alien is one who has documentation that he or she is legally in the United States, or a person who is in the process of securing documentation from the United States Immigration Service, and the Service will state that the person is being processed and will be admitted with proper documentation." App. to Juris. Statement in No. 80-1538, p. A-38.


[*207] In considering this motion, the District Court made extensive findings of fact. The court found that neither § 21.031 nor the School District policy implementing it had "either the purpose or effect of keeping illegal aliens out of the State of Texas." 458 F.Supp. 569, 575 (1978). Respecting defendants' further claim that § 21.031 was simply a financial measure designed to avoid a drain on the State's fisc, the court recognized that the increases in population resulting from the immigration of Mexican nationals into the United States had created problems for the public schools of the State, and that these problems were exacerbated by the special educational needs of immigrant Mexican children. The court noted, however, that the increase in school enrollment was primarily attributable to the admission of children who were legal residents. Id., at 575-576. It also found that while the "exclusion of all undocumented children from the public schools in Texas would eventually result in economies at some level," id., at 576, funding from both the State and Federal Governments was based primarily on the number of children enrolled. In net effect then, barring undocumented children from the schools would save money, but it would "not necessarily" improve "the quality of education." Id., at 577. The court further observed that the impact of § 21.031 was borne primarily by a very small subclass of illegal aliens, "entire families who have migrated illegally and -- for all practical purposes -- permanently to the United States." Id., at 578. 3 Finally, the court noted that under [**2390] current laws and practices "the illegal alien of today may well be the legal alien of tomorrow," 4 and that without an education, these undocumented [*208] children, "[already] disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices, . . . will become permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic class." Id., at 577.

FOOTNOTES

3 The court contrasted this group with those illegal aliens who entered the country alone in order to earn money to send to their dependents in Mexico, and who in many instances remained in this country for only a short period of time. 458 F.Supp., at 578.

4 Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Gilbert Cardenas, testified that "fifty to sixty per cent . . . of current legal alien workers were formerly illegal aliens." Id., at 577. A defense witness, Rolan Heston, District Director of the Houston District of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, testified that "undocumented children can and do live in the United States for years, and adjust their status through marriage to a citizen or permanent resident." Ibid. The court also took notice of congressional proposals to "legalize" the status of many unlawful entrants. Id., at 577-578. See also n. 17, infra.


The District Court held that illegal aliens were entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that § 21.031 violated that Clause. Suggesting that "the state's exclusion of undocumented children from its public schools . . . may well be the type of invidiously motivated state action for which the suspect classification doctrine was designed," the court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the statute would survive a "strict scrutiny" analysis because, in any event, the discrimination embodied in the statute was not supported by a rational basis. Id., at 585. The District Court also concluded that the Texas statute [***794] violated the Supremacy Clause. 5 Id., at 590-592.

FOOTNOTES

5 The court found § 21.031 inconsistent with the scheme of national regulation under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and with federal laws pertaining to funding and discrimination in education. The court distinguished De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), by emphasizing that the state bar on employment of illegal aliens involved in that case mirrored precisely the federal policy, of protecting the domestic labor market, underlying the immigration laws. The court discerned no express federal policy to bar illegal immigrants from education. 458 F.Supp., at 590-592.


The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the District Court's injunction. 628 F.2d 448 (1980). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had erred in finding the Texas statute pre-empted by federal law. 6 With respect to [*209] equal protection, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all essential respects the analysis of the District Court, id., at 454-458, concluding that § 21.031 was "constitutionally infirm regardless of whether it was tested using the mere rational basis standard or some more stringent test," id., at 458. We noted probable jurisdiction. 451 U.S. 968 (1981).

FOOTNOTES

6 The Court of Appeals noted that De Canas v. Bica, supra, had not foreclosed all state regulation with respect to illegal aliens, and found no express or implied congressional policy favoring the education of illegal aliens. The court therefore concluded that there was no pre-emptive conflict between state and federal law. 628 F.2d, at 451-454.


No. 80-1934

In re Alien Children Education Litigation

During 1978 and 1979, suits challenging the constitutionality of § 21.031 and various local practices undertaken on the authority of that provision were filed in the United States District Courts for the Southern, Western, and Northern Districts of Texas. Each suit named the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency as defendants, along with local officials. In November 1979, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, on motion of the State, consolidated the claims against the state officials into a single action to be heard in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. A hearing was conducted in February and March 1980. In July 1980, the court entered an opinion and order holding that § 21.031 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [**2391] In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F.Supp. 544. 7 The court held that HN3 "the absolute deprivation of education should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute deprivation is the result of complete inability to pay for the desired benefit." Id., at 582. The court determined that the State's concern for fiscal integrity was not a compelling state interest, id., at 582-583; that exclusion of these children had not been shown to be necessary to improve education within the State, id., at 583; and that the educational needs of the children statutorily excluded were not different from the needs of children not excluded, ibid. The court therefore concluded that [*210] § 21.031 was not carefully tailored to advance the asserted state interest in an acceptable manner. Id., at 583-584. While appeal of the District Court's decision was pending, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in No. 80-1538. Apparently on the strength of that [***795] opinion, the Court of Appeals, on February 23, 1981, summarily affirmed the decision of the Southern District. We noted probable jurisdiction, 452 U.S. 937 (1981), and consolidated this case with No. 80-1538 for briefing and argument. 8

FOOTNOTES

7 The court concluded that § 21.031 was not pre-empted by federal laws or international agreements. 501 F.Supp., at 584-596.

8 Appellees in both cases continue to press the argument that § 21.031 is pre-empted by federal law and policy. In light of our disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment issue, we have no occasion to reach this claim.