Dec 3 McNeil-Lehrer – New Iran Nuclear Assessment

The first posting is by "solutions" and comprises the book review by the Wall Street Journal (probably Israel's strongest supporter in the American media) of "Failure Is Not An Option" by John Bolton (U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control (2001-2005) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (2005-20006)). The fourth posting is the "Face the Nation" transcript for Nov. 25 re Condi Rice's Mideast Peace Conference involving 50 nations at Camp David and the inter-relationship between the conference and War on Iran/Iraq/Terror.
Post Reply
johnkarls
Posts: 2034
Joined: Fri Jun 29, 2007 8:43 pm

Dec 3 McNeil-Lehrer – New Iran Nuclear Assessment

Post by johnkarls »

.
Editorial Notes:

McNeil-Lehrer no longer provides transcripts – only audio re-plays. Accordingly, I (John Karls) had to prepare this transcript by stopping the audio re-play every 5-6 words to type up what had been said and, occasionally, backing up to repeat what was said to insure the transcript was correct.

Incidentally, it strikes me as somewhat odd that after Gwen Ifill's introductory piece, she interviews two experts, one of whom (Peter Rodman) is described as serving President Bush until last year as "Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs... He’s now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution." This is because Brookings is normally considered the predominant "think tank" of the Democratic Party (much like the American Enterprise Institute is normally considered the predominant "think tank" of the Republican Party).


**********
Jim Lehrer:

Gwen Ifill has our Iran coverage.

Gwen Ifill:

The New Intelligence Report (“N.I.E.”) released today contradicts an earlier, more pessimistic assessment made just two years ago. That 2005 report concluded with high confidence that Iran was determined to develop nuclear weapons. But the revised consensus view of 16 U.S. intelligence agencies says Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

The unclassified portion of the report read in part, Tehran’s decision to disband its uranium-enrichment program was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure. And it suggests that it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.

The key judgments also determined that Iran could probably not acquire enough material for a weapon before 2009 and probably could not produce a bomb before 2013.

The N.I.E. also concludes that Iran had not re-started its nuclear-weapons program as of mid-2007, but we currently do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said the report showed the Administration’s suspicions of Iran were correct –

Stephen Hadley on videotape:

On balance the Estimate is good news. On one hand, it confirms that we were right about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On the other had, it tells us that we have made some progress in trying to insure that that does not happen.

But it also tells us that the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a very serious problem.

Gwen Ifill:

The new report comes just two months after President Bush issued this warning about Iran’s nuclear capabilities –

President Bush on videotape:

If you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon.

Gwen Ifill:

Hadley said today, even taking into account the new information contained in today’s report, the Administration remains concerned about Iran’s nuclear intention.

For more, we now turn to two experts who have been tracking this issue for some time.

David Kaye led the hunt to find Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. During the early 1990’s, he was a nuclear weapons inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency. He’s now a senior research fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, a non-profit “think tank.”

And Peter Rodman until last year served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. He’s now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Welcome to you both.

David Kaye, we just heard Stephen Hadley say on balance this is good news, what we’re learning about in this new report. What do you say?

David Kaye:

Well I think it is good news and totally unexpected apparently from the Administration. Look, Iran stopped, if you believe this report, its nuclear weapons program in 2003. But the really good news is the conclusion they did it because it was concerned about the level of international scrutiny and the potential impact of sanctions.

So it shows that, look, Iran does respond to pressure. And I think that is extraordinarily good news for those of us. And I think that’s almost everyone who prefer a world in which Iran does not have nuclear weapons.

Gwen Ifill:

What do you say, Peter Rodman?

Peter Rodman:

I agree completely with David. There’s a debate going on right now inside Iran precisely because of the new pressures – economic sanctions, even some of the war talk I think has had a constructive purpose by stimulating some debate in Iran about should they continue with enrichment which they seem determined to do.

But I think the report and a point that’s explicitly made in this Intelligence Report, that Iran is susceptible to international pressures and I think the Administration is right to want to maintain the momentum of the current diplomacy.

Gwen Ifill:

Having been someone, David Kaye, who’s made some effort to look for these kinds of weapons, did it surprise you to discover intelligence agencies could just two years later say: “Oh, we overlooked this detail that they had stopped producing these nuclear weapons, or moving toward producing these weapons, in 2003?

David Kaye:

No, Gwen, it really didn’t. I know how bad our intelligence is in terms of our knowledge of what goes on in countries like Iran and North Korea. Iran is a very difficult country. It is one that, believe it or not, was a not a primary target for a number of years and so we’ve been slow to develop the assets that would allow us to understand it.

I think it is amazing that a program that was stopped in 2003, we didn’t apparently know about and conclude sometime in early 2007, if you believe the commentaries given today as the report was released. That is pretty extraordinary and it does raise some serious questions about how much we really do know of what’s going on in Iran.

Gwen Ifill:

What do you think about that, Peter Rodman?

Peter Rodman:

Iran is making it hard. I mean one of the problems in the U.N. diplomacy is Iran is defying the international community’s effort to find out more to get them to stop enrichment. So it’s what the intelligence community calls “a hard target.” And it’s there opacity that is part of the problem.

Gwen Ifill:

Is there a credibility problem for the Administration after they have pushed so hard for taking a tougher line against Iran.

Peter Rodman:

Well, I can’t judge that. I mean I think the rest of the world has the same intelligence and I think to the credit of the intelligence community that when they get new information, the tell the President and we put it forward. I mean that’s the best we can do.

But David is right that it is a little disturbing because I don’t trust the Iranians. I mean they are giving themselves the option of starting this up again. I mean they’re insisting on continuing their enrichment. So, hopefully, it doesn’t take us four years to find out that they started up again.

Gwen Ifill:

Given what the report found, do believe based on the conclusions, and they have terms of art – “highly confident, moderately confident” – about different areas of this program, do you believe Iran is trying to pursue creating, building a nuclear weapon?

David Kaye:

I think all you can say, based on the evidence we have available, is certainly they did in the past. They pursued activities that were consistent only with pursuing a nuclear weapon.

Gwen Ifill:

Isn’t that what they said about Iraq?

David Kaye:

Well in Iraq, remember, in 1991 we discovered Iraq did in fact pursue a nuclear weapon program. And, you know, the great irony right now is that in 1991, I brought the news back of what we discovered and the intelligence community, it was a surprise to them. They had assessed that Iraq had didn’t have a nuclear weapons program. And consequently they over-compensated in 2003, over-assessed it and we were surprised there.

But one worries about with intelligence is, because it is so difficult, all hard targets, or the interesting cases, the easy targets aren’t interesting. And it’s really possible that you over-compensate and you really don’t know what the…

And Peter’s right, you know, what if they re-start the program. How long are we going to have to wait to determine that?

Gwen Ifill:

Well, exactly, how would we know?

David Kaye:

How would we know?

Gwen Ifill:

So, Peter Rodman, how would the Administration or can the Administration continue to make the case for even tougher sanctions, even there has been a lively debate going on in Washington, you know, whether the Bush Administration is marching to war in Iran?

Peter Rodman:

Well the focus is diplomatic and the U.N. Security Council has already passed two resolutions, unanimously I think, demanding that Iran stop uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment is one of the pivotal, one of the crucial elements, of giving themselves an option to have a bomb.

So I have, I think the international community ought to continue this effort to keep the pressure on Iran and try to persuade the Iranian to continue to back off which I think at least in this case would mean that the next issue is uranium enrichment.

If they continue doing that, giving themselves the option, to get a bomb.

David Kaye:

But, Gwen, I think we ought to acknowledge – this report is going to make it very hard in dealing with the Chinese and the Russians, the two obstacles to hard, sure sanctions.

Gwen Ifill:

Why would that be?

David Kaye:

Look, since 2003 they’ve stopped their program. Why continue to increase the pressure, and there’s a great danger the argument will be, that all you will do is reinforce the hard liners who say “we get nothing for this and we should re-start the program.”

Gwen Ifill:

What do you say to that?

David Kaye:

Well what I say is in fact, now that we know this, it is awfully hard to continue the State Department’s line that you don’t talk to people like the Iranians. I think in fact we need to talk to people who are engaged in programs like this and explain how dangerous they are. Be sure they understand the risks they’re running. It shows in this case the Iranians understood the risks they were running and decided to back off. We ought to go into that. And the report also speaks in there in a very opaque sort of way that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons for its own national interests and its own security and prestige interests. We ought to address the security interests in the Middle East.

Gwen Ifill:

Is this an argument for talking to Iran because this is evidence that external pressures have worked?

Peter Rodman:

Well, we have a lot of other issues with Iran and that’s a bigger subject. I just worry that if we leave the pressures, that gives the Iranians a free, you know, it opens the door for them to start this up again. I think they want a bomb for domination in the Gulf Region. I’m not sure we can talk them out of it, so’m not sure that conversation is going to help us right now.

Gwen Ifill:

Why do you think that?

Peter Rodman:

Well, I think this is an ideological-driven foreign policy. I mean when that revolution took place in 1979, they defined us as their enemy and I think that’s, now you have militant, this is a revolutionary regime still in a militant phase. So I’m not sure conversation is going to charm them out of their ambition.

David Kaye:

The decision to stop in 2003 was not an ideological decision. The intelligence estimate says this was not an ideological decision. It was a pragmatic decision on a cost-benefit analysis.

Peter Rodman:

Because we had raised the cost. I’m afraid that the world is now going to relieve them of these costs and relieve them of these risks and I don’t trust them. That’s the problem.

Gwen Ifill:

When you say “raise the cost” do you mean cost because they didn’t have the capability, or raise the cost because diplomatically they were feeling too pressured?

David Kaye:

I think they were feeling too pressured. They were worried about it.

Peter Rodman:

We had just overthrown Saddam Hussein, so I think that message reverberated.

David Kaye:

And we think of Iran as a closed society. It’s actually in many ways not a closed society. It’s the most cosmopolitan society in the Middle East. There are huge Iranian populations here and in France. I think they were worried about 65% of their population is under the age of 25. Isolation is not politically appealing. And Ahmadinijad


Today in Iran is running into opposition from those who do not like the prospect of it. That’s why I think our opening up, our talking to them and expressing the dangers they are running are more likely feed that cost-benefit practical non-ideological.

Gwen Ifill.

Final word.

Peter Rodman:

Well, I worry tat just the opposite will happen if they see themselves relieved of pressures then they may be tempted to go ahead anyway.

Gwen Ifill:

Peter Rodman, David Kaye, thank you both very much.

Post Reply

Return to “Participant Comments Re War With Iran - for Dec 13”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 1 guest