Text of the Report - p. 7

[johnkarls]

Government Organization and Culture

terproliferation, counterterrorism, and regional issues. Another senior
official noted that compartmentation to preserve secrecy makes it difficult for these communities to exchange information.

ACTION: The intelligence community should improve the
sharing of WMD proliferation and terrorism intelligence as a
top priority, and should accelerate efforts to ensure that analysts and collectors receive consistent training and guidance
on handling sensitive and classified information.

If analysts and collectors working against a common target do not
have access to all relevant information about the target, the mission
will be less likely to succeed. To ensure that sensitive sources and
methods as well as privacy and civil liberties are protected, innovative
methods to manage risk must accompany greater information sharing.
Adopting uniform standards for handling sensitive information and
increasing trust across the intelligence community are goals that have
not yet been fully achieved.

ACTION: The intelligence community should expedite
efforts to recruit people with critical language capabilities and
cultural backgrounds. In conjunction with this effort, the
intelligence community should streamline the hiring process,
especially for applicants with critical language capabilities.

In order to prevent and counter efforts by terrorists to acquire
WMD, it is imperative that human intelligence collection officers be
able to gather information on the related activities of terrorist groups.
This mission requires personnel with the necessary language skills, as
well as ethnic and cultural backgrounds, to gain access to the communities where terrorist groups operate.

Since the implementation of Foreign Language Strategic Program
in May 2003, the CIA has increased its overall language capability by
50 percent. The number of employees with tested capability in the
agency’s 10 mission-critical languages rose by just over 16 percent in
fiscal year 2007 alone. However, for some of these languages the overall number of officers with proficiency is still too low.

The Commission believes that the intelligence community should

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continue and accelerate its efforts to hire and train individuals with
critical skills and backgrounds for the counterproliferation and counterterrorism missions. To that end, the process for granting security
clearances must be streamlined, while background investigations must
remain thorough enough to ensure that national security is not compromised.

ACTION: The intelligence community should address its
weakening science and technology base in nuclear science and
biotechnology and enhance collaboration on WMD issues
with specialists outside the intelligence community, including
nongovernmental and foreign experts.

The use of cutting-edge science and technology is crucial in
addressing WMD terrorism collection and analysis. This need is
greater in the field of biology (more than two dozen types of bacteria,
viruses, and other pathogens have been adopted or considered for use
as biological warfare agents by states and non-state actors) than in
nuclear science (nuclear weapons incorporate highly enriched uranium and plutonium as the primary types of fissile material). Furthermore, advances in genetic engineering and synthetic biology have
raised the possibility of creating, respectively, modified versions of
existing pathogens or entirely new pathogens. Advanced aerosolization
technologies are also available from commercial sources.

ACTION: The intelligence community and law enforcement
should continue to focus and prioritize collection on WMD
state and non-state networks that include smuggling, criminal
enterprises, suppliers, and financiers, and they should develop
innovative human and technical intelligence capabilities and
techniques designed specifically to meet the intelligence
requirements of WMD terrorism.

The nexus of proliferation and terrorism is a top collection priority
for the intelligence community, and the array of targets is massive. They
include transnational terrorist and extremist groups, supplier networks,
criminal organizations, front companies, financiers, smugglers, and the
WMD capabilities of state and non-state actors, to name a few.

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The ability to identify and counter foreign denial and deception
activities is particularly critical in the area of WMD proliferation and
terrorism. Therefore, maintaining and improving the intelligence community’s ability to counter such efforts must be a top priority. Although
the United States continues to have an intelligence advantage in some
areas, this advantage will erode as foreign knowledge of U.S. systems
and capabilities increases. Reversing this trend requires the development of intelligence systems that provide “unexpected, unwarned, and
unconventional” collection capabilities, and these methods must be
better protected from unauthorized disclosure.

ACTION: The President, in consultation with the DNI,
should provide to Congress within 180 days of taking office an
assessment of changes needed in existing legislation to enable
the intelligence community to carry out its counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, and WMD terrorism missions. In so
doing, the intelligence community must keep WMD terrorism
a top priority while ensuring that the broader counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts do not suffer.

The National Security Workforce

Despite recent initiatives, the U.S. national security community still
lacks the flexibility and workforce culture needed to attract, train, and
retain people with the skills needed to help the government respond to
global network threats such as terrorism and proliferation.

In May 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order 13434,
National Security Professional Development, which focuses on building and maintaining a new generation of national security professionals. Subsequently, in November 2007, an implementation plan was
published to guide the executive steering committee, chaired by the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in recruiting, training, and retaining the necessary personnel.

RECOMMENDATION 11: The United States must build a
national security workforce for the 21st century.

The Commission believes there are several specific actions that the
United States should undertake to implement this recommendation.

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ACTION: The U.S. government should recruit the next generation of national security experts by establishing a program of
education, training, and joint duty with the goal of creating a
culture of interagency collaboration, flexibility, and innovation.

The U.S. government lacks the flexibility of the private sector to
accommodate individuals who are inclined to switch jobs frequently
and forgo long-term stability in return for rapid professional growth
and new challenges. Unless the government can offer careers that provide continuing professional and intellectual challenges, it will have
difficulty attracting the best and the brightest.

The President should establish a government-wide professional education and training program for the national security officer corps, covering multiple stages of officers’ careers and including curriculum on
combating terrorism and WMD proliferation. To facilitate the creation of
an interagency professional education program in national security, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the cabinet secretaries
must develop a strategic plan that takes into account that, unlike the
Defense Department, the intelligence community and most other national
security agencies lack the manpower to assign officers to extended training
programs without suffering a drop in operational capability.

ACTION: The National Security Professional Development
Implementation Plan must meet its requirement to recruit,
train, and retain sufficient national security professionals,
including at the U.S. national laboratories.

The U.S. national laboratories have a critical need for an influx of
new, highly trained personnel. The Commission’s interviews with Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman and other high-level officials of
the Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories, the intelligence community, and the Department of Homeland Security all
elicited concerns that the current workforce at the national laboratories is aging and will soon retire.

According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Half of our
nuclear lab scientists are over 50 years old, and many of those under 50
have had limited or no involvement in the design and development of a

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nuclear weapon....By some estimates, within the next several years,
three-quarters of the workforce in nuclear engineering and at the national
laboratories will reach retirement age.” There are serious uncertainties
about how the government will replace individuals with highly specialized
skills as they retire, especially in light of the competition for these skills
from the private sector. Today’s scientists do not see the laboratories as
innovative places to work and build challenging careers. No concerted
effort has yet been made to recruit the “next generation” workforce—but
without that workforce, our long-term national security is threatened.

ACTION: The implementation plan must ensure incentives
for distributing experience in both combating terrorism and
combating WMD. The President’s top national security officials should consider including assignments in more than one
department and agency as a prerequisite for advancement to
the National Security Council or to department or agency
leadership level.

Greater opportunity for education and training is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for creating an effective national security workforce for the 21st century. To foster true interagency collaboration,
national security officers from across the government must have the
experience of working closely with colleagues from other agencies.
The Department of Defense pursues this goal through joint duty
requirements, and a recent directive from the DNI mandated that
intelligence officers must serve a joint tour before they are eligible for
promotion to senior service. But the requirement for joint duty should
begin early in an officer’s career. In addition, the U.S. government
should promote and fund advanced education in both nuclear science
and biology, as well as joint training for crisis response, including the
expeditious and effective delivery of federal capabilities to state and
local governments and to foreign partners.

Global Ideological Engagement

The United States has been successful at using its defense and intelligence resources to capture or eliminate individuals involved in al Qaeda’s
quest for a WMD capability. But our nation has been less successful
at using persuasion to deter terrorist recruitment and indoctrination of

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individuals who might someday use a nuclear or biological weapon
against Americans or our allies.

Efforts to prevent terrorist recruitment cannot rely on the same
predominantly military tools that are used to capture or kill terrorists
and facilitators. Instead, the U.S. government must be more creative in
developing “non-kinetic” measures to engage the enemy ideologically.

U.S. counterterrorism strategy must effectively use the tools of soft
power if we are to prevent WMD terrorism. Doing so will require cultural changes within the civilian foreign policy and national security
agencies similar to the changes that have occurred within the military
and the intelligence community.
These powers of persuasion include, at a minimum, the capability
to project targeted messages about America’s intentions and beliefs in
support of specific foreign policy goals and to undermine the terrorists’
credibility and recruiting efforts by assisting allied countries in developing greater social and economic stability at the grassroots level. To
be effective in this undertaking, the U.S. foreign policy community
must define its role in our efforts to stop the proliferation and use of
WMD.

RECOMMENDATION 12: U.S. counterterrorism strategy
must more effectively counter the ideology behind WMD terrorism. The United States should develop a more coherent and
sustained strategy and capabilities for global ideological engagement to prevent future recruits, supporters, and facilitators.

The U.S. foreign policy community needs to alter its culture and
organization so that it can work across agency lines to make soft power an
option just as viable and effective as hard power. This change is essential;
it should be a top priority of the next President’s foreign policy team.

ACTION: The Secretary of State, in conjunction with the

U.S. Agency for International Development and other departments, should take the lead in building an organic capability
within the civilian agencies of the U.S. government for coordinating, integrating, and delivering foreign assistance, public
diplomacy, and strategic communications. These efforts must
be integrated under a single overarching strategy.
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At present, such a coherent strategy is lacking. Like foreign assistance, programs for public diplomacy and strategic communications are
dispersed throughout the U.S. government, and they are executed without coordination to ensure that they emphasize consistent messages and
reinforce U.S. policy. To remedy these weaknesses, the Secretary of
State should develop an integrated strategy for global ideological
engagement that supports U.S. foreign assistance efforts, including a
government-wide assessment of what capabilities are needed and how
to create them within civilian agencies.

The Secretary should develop this strategy in close coordination
with the President’s senior advisor on WMD proliferation and terrorism, so that the senior advisor can consider how global ideological
engagement can contribute to the overall effort to prevent WMD terrorism. The Secretary of State should then develop a process to coordinate this integrated strategy, ensuring that consistent messages
accompany all public diplomacy and foreign assistance initiatives. At
the same time, the strategy should be flexible enough that it can be tailored to different regions and countries. The next administration
should also consider how best to reinvigorate USAID to deliver development and humanitarian assistance in an integrated fashion.

Communicating U.S. values and interests to a global audience is a
major challenge in an era of instantaneous communications and
24-hour multimedia news reporting. Traditional vehicles, such as Voice
of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty programming,
which once reached their targeted listeners only via shortwave radio,
are now available as webcasts and telecasts, in many different languages—and their English-language broadcasts have a wide global
audience. But other states and non-state interests are also seeking to
influence world opinion and have moved swiftly to utilize the communications tools of the 21st century. China is beaming extensive programming into Africa, in English, at a time when the U.S. government
has proposed cutting the budgets for English-language broadcasting.
At present, al Qaeda is using a full arsenal of media resources.

The United States must develop a comprehensive strategy for
implementing this crucial facet of its public diplomacy—something
that is currently lacking. The Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs should design and implement a strategic
communications plan to support global ideological engagement and

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buttress deterrence. The aim of this strategy should be to create a
sense of revulsion against the idea of WMD terrorism, conveying the
message that it is in everyone’s interest to prevent groups like al Qaeda
from acquiring such weapons. The President should engage foreign
partners, especially in Muslim countries, and stress that al Qaeda’s
acquisition and use of WMD would be a catastrophe for all mankind.

In addition, the strategic communications plan should work to
reframe Cold War deterrence strategy to address 21st-century threats.
Public diplomacy and strategic communications can help promote awareness and cooperation internationally and in the private sector (industry
and academia), especially regarding the prevention of bioterrorism and
the misuse of biotechnology. The deterrence strategy should make clear
to smugglers and facilitators that trafficking in WMD materials, technologies, or expertise is a redline. If they cross it, they will unite nations against
them, resulting in the total disruption of their operations. Terrorist groups
can be deterred if they believe that a particular weapon or tactic is likely
to fail—and also if they become convinced that even if they have short-
term success, the people whose support they most desire will turn vehemently against them. This should be another important tool in our efforts
to halt terrorist efforts to obtain WMD.

As part of this plan, the President should expand the declaratory
policy that threatens harsh retaliation against any state that assists a terrorist group in acquiring and using a WMD. This declaratory policy
would mention possible retaliatory options and should be aligned with
public statements and strategic communications, such as high-level
discussions with foreign leaders. For the policy to be credible, however, the United States must demonstrate effective nuclear and biological attribution capabilities.

The United States should fight violent extremist ideology with the
same commitment with which it contained Communist ideology. This
commitment should include the application of cultural and ideological
pressure at all points of the globe to counteract terrorist violence and
nihilism.

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The Role of the Citizen

In personal preparedness, each individual can make a huge differ

ence. It is really an area where you can empower the individual.

—Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff

Tom Brokaw was doing his homework in early September 2008,
reviewing his old calendars and personal documents. As the former
managing editor and anchor of NBC Nightly News, he had long established a rule that he would cover the news but not make it. But he
decided to break that rule. He agreed to testify at the Commission’s
hearing in New York City because he wanted to provide a detailed personal narrative of how events unfolded in 2001, when two of his assistants came in contact with a white powder that spilled out of two
envelopes that had come in the mail, addressed to him. His testimony
was riveting as he walked us through the weeks of wrong guesses and
misdiagnoses before medical authorities realized that his two assistants were victims of cutaneous anthrax. Brokaw’s assistants eventually
recovered but his story was an example of the destructive power of
anthrax when used as a weapon.

But there was something else that Brokaw did before appearing at
our hearing that produced an insight every bit as valuable. It highlighted why our Commission concluded that this section on the need to
inform and empower citizens was a fitting way to end our report.

Tom Brokaw told us he wanted to see just what the U.S. government has done since 2001 to better inform citizens about attacks from
this specific weapon of mass destruction:

So I thought I would check [the] Homeland Security website
before I came down here today. I typed in “anthrax attack.” I

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got a keynote address by the assistant secretary of health on the
meaning of an anthrax attack, remarks by the Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, a testimony by a physician before the
House of Representatives, testimony of an assistant secretary
chief medical officer about how a prophylaxis program will be
initiated early to reduce the economic impact of anthrax. I got
almost no information that would be useful [to] me in that culture of chaos if I needed help to find out where I go, what it
looks like, and what the next course of action should be.

A well-informed and mobilized citizenry has long been one of the
United States’ greatest resources. While much of this report has
focused on what the U.S. government must do to prevent the use of
weapons of mass destruction, it is also important to recognize the contribution that all Americans can make in preventing such an attack
against our country.

Faced with a serious problem of homegrown terrorism, the United
Kingdom has come to recognize the untapped power of the British
people in countering radicalization. During a meeting with our Commission, a senior Scotland Yard official succinctly expressed the British
law enforcement agency’s conclusion: “Communities defeat terrorism.”

The British government has embraced the reality that the public
can represent a vast early warning network. Cooperative relationships
between citizens and law enforcement are becoming a major weapon
in combating terrorism and radicalization in the United Kingdom. The
United States has much to learn from the British example. A concerted
effort is needed to involve the American public in prevention efforts.
This effort should start by developing a public education program that
goes well beyond the vague admonition to report “suspicious activities.” The public must be made aware of what activities are suspicious
and of their responsibility to inform authorities.

The public must also be prepared for its role in responding to a
potential WMD attack. Citizens must be educated about what they
should expect from their government in such a crisis—and what government expects from them in the form of advance preparation and
responsible action. If we show potential terrorists that we are ready—
as a community and as a nation—then they are less likely to believe
that their attack can achieve all of its destructive goals.

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RECOMMENDATION 13: The next administration must
work to openly and honestly engage the American citizen,
encouraging a participatory approach to meeting the challenges of the new century.

The Commission believes there are several specific actions that the
United States should undertake to implement this recommendation.

ACTION: The federal government should practice greater
openness of public information so that citizens better understand the threat and the risk this threat poses to them.

Although the Commission did find relevant government-created
content regarding anthrax on the website of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, it is clear from Brokaw’s testimony that more
must be done to educate the public regarding what information is
available and where to find it. Of course the information should be easily accessible. In the event of an attack, quick access to information can
save untold lives. The government would be well served to have ready-
made messages, adaptable to the circumstances of any specific event,
available for swift distribution following an attack. Such messages
could be delivered by government officials; natural social networks,
such as schools and churches; and the media, including the Internet.

The Department of Homeland Security’s use of color-coded threat
levels was well intentioned, but it has resulted in highly simplistic representation of the nation’s risk. Citizens are often confused by the meaning
of changes in threat levels and do not know what actions they should take
in response. If such an advisory system is continued in the next administration, changes in threat levels should be accompanied by explanatory
statements and by recommendations of appropriate actions.

ACTION: The next administration should, as a priority, work
with a consortium of state and local governments to develop a
publicly available checklist of actions each level of government should take to prevent or ameliorate the consequences
of WMD terrorism. Such a checklist could be used by citizens
to hold their governments accountable for action or inaction.

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Responsibility for preventing a WMD attack is not limited to the federal government; state and local governments have a critical role to play in
helping to protect the nation. The next administration should work with a
representative group of state and local governments to develop a simple
checklist of steps for them to improve their ability to prevent such attacks.
This checklist should be developed within the first six months of the next
administration, and it should be made publicly available to enable citizens
to hold their state and local governments accountable.

For instance, such a checklist should include adequate support for
first responders and public health units. It might expand in metropolitan areas to funding for local police departments to ensure participation on local FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces. These task forces
serve, in effect, as the operational arm of domestic counterterrorism
efforts, and state and local participation is vital to ensuring their success. Yet statements during Commission interviews and hearings made
clear that the further local governments are removed in time from September 11, 2001, and the more distant they are from New York and
Washington, D.C., the less priority they give to counterterrorism.

The Commission recognizes that many state and local governments
are currently under enormous financial pressure. However, such challenges cannot be allowed to increase our nation’s vulnerability to another
attack. A checklist will give citizens a meaningful metric to evaluate their
state and local governments’ counterterrorism efforts, and though it may
not ensure that minimum capabilities are maintained, it will help Americans understand the consequences of inadequate preparation.

ACTION: The federal government should seek to strengthen
its ties with immigrant and second-generation populations,
especially from the Middle East and Asia, to encourage greater
engagement and investment by private U.S. citizens in improving the civil and cultural institutions of foreign partners.

The United States is a nation of immigrants, but the U.S. government is often slow to use this enormous asset when developing and
implementing foreign outreach and assistance. A multitude of ethnic
cultural and professional societies thrive within the United States and
provide direct links to foreign countries. Given these resources, the
government should engage immigrant groups and second- and third

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generation citizens in supporting U.S. foreign assistance and institution-
building efforts. These populations are often appreciative of the opportunities available to them in the United States and are supportive of

U.S. government efforts to improve conditions in the countries of their
or their family’s origin. Yet as one senior official acknowledged to the
Commission, “We simply haven’t asked them to help.”
Such informal assistance and engagement programs have the
added benefit of directly supporting other recommendations made by
the Commission, especially the recommendation to improve global
ideological engagement. Immigrant or second- and third-generation
populations are likely seen as more credible spokespeople than are
representatives of the U.S. government.

ACTION: As a priority of the next administration, the Secretary of Homeland Security should release a set of recommendations on which citizens can act to improve preparedness
against potential WMD attacks. Such recommendations could
range from following the Red Cross disaster preparedness
guidelines to encouraging their workplaces and children’s
schools to prepare emergency plans.

There are simple steps that most individuals can take to mitigate the
consequences of an attack—even a WMD attack. By demonstrating that
they could reduce at a national level the potential damage and lasting
effects caused by an attack, citizens might convince a terrorist organization that pursuing such an attack was not worth the effort and thus deter it.

The Department of Homeland Security, through its Ready.gov
program, has sought to outline steps that Americans can take to prepare for potential attacks. This effort has received considerable criticism, however, both because communications during the initial rollout
were poor and because the advice was too simplistic. The recommendations to purchase plastic sheeting and duct tape were roundly
ridiculed, and in this critical first engagement with the public DHS lost
credibility. Now, more than seven years since the 9/11 attacks, the public has also grown complacent.

The next administration has a chance to reengage the public in establishing a culture of preparedness. Within the first six months, the next Secretary of Homeland Security, building on the wide range of knowledge

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located in think tanks, state and local governments, universities, and other
centers of expertise, should release a set of clear and specific actions that
citizens can take to improve their preparedness for WMD attacks.

ACTION: Like the government, citizens should transform
their involvement to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
This includes holding political leaders accountable for the performance of the government in countering emerging threats.

Elsewhere in this report are recommendations for how Congress
should reform to meet the challenges of this new security environment. While mandating at least two sweeping reforms of the executive
branch, Congress has failed to substantively act on any recommendations to reform itself. No other branch of government has the authority
to compel Congress to evolve to meet new challenges. Ultimately, the
greatest stimulus of, and check on, the actions of Congress remains the
American people.

°°°
On the day before the seventh anniversary of the infamous terrorist
attacks on America’s homeland, our Commission convened a public
hearing in New York City. We marked the day, September 10, 2008, by
hearing first from one whose family suffered a grievous loss in the
attacks—Carie Lemack, a founder of Families of September 11. Then
we heard from witnesses who shared insights that came from their
work in government, the media, academia, and law enforcement. It
was well into the day when Commissioner Raymond Kelly of the New
York City Police Department testified. And in his presentation, he
summed up with poignancy and urgency the challenge facing us all
today—globally, nationally, locally, and in the one role we all share, as
concerned citizens.

“Whether it’s fixing gaping holes in regulation, securing loose
nuclear materials abroad, or fully funding programs here at home that
represent our last line of defense, we have absolutely no time to lose,”
Commissioner Kelly told the Commission. “Everything we know about
al Qaeda tells us they will try to hit us again, possibly the next time with
a weapon of mass destruction. We must do everything in our power to
stop them before it’s too late.”

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Appendices

Review of Implementation of
the Baker-Cutler Report

Background

A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with
Russia—perhaps better known as the Baker-Cutler report—was released in
January 2001. It reflected the findings of a task force established by Secretary
of Energy Bill Richardson and co-chaired by former Senate Majority Leader
Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler that was tasked
to “review and assess DOE’s nonproliferation programs in Russia and make
recommendations for their improvement.” The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 directs this Commission to reassess
and, where necessary, update the Baker-Cutler report and examine how effectively its recommendations have been implemented. This appendix addresses
that legislative requirement. Part I examines Baker-Cutler recommendations
and their implementation; part II reviews key programs designed to address
nuclear security concerns in Russia, as administered by the Department of
Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

Part I: Assessment

The Baker-Cutler report found that (1) the danger that nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or a
hostile nation was the most urgent and unmet national security threat to the
United States; (2) the budget levels for DOE’s programs were inadequate and
management of cooperative nonproliferation programs across the U.S. government too diffuse; and (3) the U.S. government needed to “develop an
enhanced response proportionate to the threat.”

Each of these findings were addressed by the Department of Energy.
Recognizing the risks from undersecured nuclear materials in Russia, DOE

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accelerated efforts to better secure that material. The department also
increased the budget for these and related efforts and, in recognition of the
gravity of the threat, initiated a number of programs to complement nuclear
materials security efforts.

The Baker-Cutler report specified six steps to be taken, calling on the
United States to:

• Formulate a strategic plan to secure and/or neutralize in the
next eight to ten years all nuclear weapons-usable material located
in Russia and to prevent the outflow from Russia of scientific
expertise that could be used for nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction;
• Identify specific goals and measurable objectives within the
strategic plan and associated budgets for each program, as well as
provide criteria for success and an exit strategy;
• Accelerate the pace and increase funding for specific programs
in coordination with the strategic plan;
• Reach agreement with the Russian Federation at the highest level on
acceptable measures for transparency and access;

• Improve coordination within the U.S. Government by establishing a
high-level leadership position in the White House; and
• Focus public and congressional attention on this critical issue.
The report’s principal recommendation—that a comprehensive strategic
plan be formulated to address concerns over nuclear materials in Russia and
stem the flow of expertise—was not implemented. However, the spirit of the
Baker-Cutler recommendations—which aimed primarily at expanding and
accelerating activity to secure nuclear materials in Russia—was clearly followed, accelerated significantly by the 2005 Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative. One concern is that the program has not had access to all the sites in
Russia where sensitive materials are stored, and it has proved difficult to get a
comprehensive accounting from Russia of all its sites and facilities.

The United States also funded programs to reduce the prospect of scientist migration, the second principal substantive objective of the Baker-Cutler
report. Yet the successes of these programs, though considerable, proved hard
to quantify; and over time, changes were made as the security environment
evolved. One of DOE’s two programs (the Nuclear Cities Initiative) was eliminated. The other, the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), remains
active but at lower funding levels than in the past.

The paragraphs below summarize the Commission’s conclusions on the
other steps called for by the Baker-Cutler report.

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DOE has developed specific goals and objectives for its programs in Russia and the republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as metrics for gauging
success and determining program budgets.

The funding and pace of activity in Russia have increased. Program-level
strategic plans, though not specifically a product of the Baker-Cutler recommendation, are regularly developed, updated, and justified to senior management as part of the DOE planning process. But no government-wide strategic
plan has been formulated to guide the department’s activities in detail.

The record on the development of “exit strategies” is mixed. The fundamental mission in Russia—to secure nuclear materials there and transfer
responsibility for maintaining nuclear security upgrades to Russia—has a clear
end date mandated by Congress (2013), and it appears that this deadline will
be met. Other programs, such as efforts to facilitate the shut down of Russia’s
plutonium producing reactors, are also on track to complete their work. However, programs such as DOE’s efforts to engage nuclear scientists in civilian
pursuits do not have clearly defined end points, although they have changed
their approach to address threats as they are evolving. Nonetheless, the scientist engagement program would do well to further refine its definition of success and to ensure that its long-term objectives are commensurate with threat
projections.

No White House–level coordination position has yet been established (as
discussed in more detail in the body of this report). A senior advisor on WMD
proliferation and terrorism could help augment and elevate public awareness
of what the government is doing in this area. Currently, information is disseminated through the speeches, testimony, and public outreach efforts of DOE.

Programs to address plutonium in Russia—by facilitating the shutdown of reactors still producing it and by disposing of 34 metric tons of the
material—are now on track. A significant amount of Russia’s excess highly
enriched uranium (HEU) is being eliminated, consistent with the Baker-
Cutler objectives. At the same time, efforts are just now getting under way to
undertake feasibility studies on converting Russian civilian research reactors
from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU). The United States must urge
Russia to accelerate this conversion and to work with the United States on a
plan to make additional HEU available for blend-down (processing into a less-
enriched form).

As a means to reduce U.S. costs, the Baker-Cutler report encouraged the

U.S. government to press other nations to contribute to threat reduction programs in Russia. Shortly after the report was released, the G-8 Global Partnership, which committed G-8 and European Union states to contributing $20
billion over 10 years for threat reduction programs in Russia, was established.
Half of this amount would come from the United States, and DOE programs
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are counted toward the U.S. share. The goal is close to being met. Among the
principal contributors are Canada, Japan, other G-8 nations, and the European
Union. In addition, the National Nuclear Security Administration has received
more than $45 million in international contributions and pledges from seven
countries. DOE/NNSA also has several cost-sharing partnerships in place that
involve both monetary and in-kind contributions (equipment and training)
from more than 20 countries.

Sustainability is a concern, however. Russia has not fully committed to
increase resources for nuclear security upgrades as U.S. efforts come to completion, or taken steps to ensure that an adequate security culture will be in
place in Russia after U.S. programs have ended. Russia’s budgets to implement
and sustain physical protection and security upgrades at both the site and
national levels are unknown. Because Russia has not created a comprehensive
baseline inventory, there are no reliable and comprehensive national accounting systems to monitor fissile material in Russia. Russia and NNSA are working
together to build a federal database to track its proliferation-attractive nuclear
material.

Overall, substantial progress has been made since 2001 in meeting the
essential objectives in Russia articulated in the Baker-Cuter report. At the
same time, there is ample opportunity for further progress. Securing Russian
warheads and material must remain a priority. Without a solid and transparent
commitment by Russia to maintain the level of security that has been implemented, the existing achievements are imperiled. It is important that the
United States and Russia strengthen partnerships to secure and eliminate dangerous nuclear material, convert Russia’s civil nuclear reactors from the use of
HEU to LEU, and negotiate a transparency regime to support plutonium disposition (discussed below). In addition, securing Russia’s borders and engaging
scientists at targeted facilities in Russia in civilian pursuits should remain priority objectives. As the Baker-Cutler report emphasized, these efforts must be
coordinated within the U.S. government to ensure maximum efficiency and
effectiveness as the programs adapt to new challenges and as the United States
and Russia shift from having a donor-recipient relationship to being partners.

Next Steps—“Updating” Baker-Cutler

Looked at narrowly—in terms only of U.S. nuclear security programs in
Russia—the Baker-Cutler report has no need to be “updated.” What is more
important, as discussed in the section of our report titled “Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism,” is that, in effect, a new Baker-Cutler be undertaken in the
form of a broad strategic review of cooperative nuclear security programs
and nuclear security challenges worldwide, which include remaining work in
Russia.

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Appendices

As discussed in the text of this report, the Commission recommends that
the next President conduct a bottom-up review of all threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and throughout the world, to ensure
that they are being implemented as effectively as possible, and that a strategy
for addressing potential gaps in coverage be articulated. This assessment
should identify programs that play a critical role worldwide and could be
expanded; in addition, it should identify programs that may have achieved their
objectives or outlived their usefulness and could therefore be reduced, reoriented, or eliminated. In weighing the possible expansion of programs to other
nuclear weapons states, this review needs to evaluate the openness of such
states to U.S. or international assistance. Finally, the review needs to assess
what Russia may be willing to do in cooperation with the United States, particularly with respect to cost sharing, given its new, more active role in international affairs and the improvements in its economic status in the years since
the Baker-Cutler report was produced.

Part II: Review and Assessment
of Relevant Programs

Key programs evaluated by the Baker-Cutler commission included

• The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program, which secures nuclear weapons and materials in Russia.
• The Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement and
Transparency Implementation Program, which is blending down 500
metric tons of HEU from Russia’s weapons programs into fuel for
use in the United States.
• The Russian Plutonium Disposition Program, which commits the
United States and Russia to each eliminate 34 metric tons of plutonium declared in excess of defense requirements.
• The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which combats illicit
trafficking of nuclear material and related equipment across Russia’s
borders.
• The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Program and the
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), which implemented DOE’s scientist
engagement efforts (the programs were brought under common
management in 2002; NCI projects in Russia’s closed nuclear cities
ended in 2005, and the program was not renewed).
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Appendices

Material Protection, Control, and Accounting

The Baker-Cutler report noted that only a modest fraction of weapons-usable
material had received comprehensive security upgrades, that disputes over
access and transparency were undermining the broader context of cooperation, that no program was in place to sustain the work already done, and that a
comprehensive testing and assessment program still awaited implementation.

Since the publication of the report, the MPC&A program, in close coordination with the Department of Defense, has accelerated U.S. cooperation with
Russia on nuclear security. In February 2005, the United States and Russia
signed the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, which for the first time
included a comprehensive plan for cooperation on security upgrades of Russian
nuclear facilities at Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) and Ministry of
Defense sites. The MPC&A program is on track to complete these upgrades by
the end of 2008.

Including sites added after the Bratislava Initiative was signed, the total
scope of the MPC&A program now comprises 73 Russian nuclear warhead
sites (65 upgraded by the end of fiscal year 2008) and 224 buildings containing
nuclear material in Russia and other former Soviet countries (181 complete as
of the end of FY 2008). While the precise number of sites containing nuclear
material is not clear, these are believed to include the vast majority of overall
sites. In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, Congress mandated
that all responsibility for nuclear security work in Russia be transferred over to
the Russian Federation by January 1, 2013. The MPC&A program expects to
complete all security upgrades in Russia in 2012.

Consistent with the Baker-Cutler recommendations, MPC&A has made
considerable progress in consolidating nuclear materials in fewer facilities. For
example, the MPC&A program has eliminated special nuclear material (SNM)
from 25 buildings at civilian-sector sites, including the removal of all highly
enriched uranium from one civilian-sector site entirely. However, many Russian
nuclear sites are apparently reluctant to give up nuclear material, either because
they plan to restart dormant research and operations activity or because they
wish to retain the prestige and worker benefits associated with a nuclear mission.

In 2007 the MPC&A program developed a Joint Sustainability Plan, signed
by U.S. and Russian government officials, which requires Rosatom to sustain
U.S.-provided physical protection upgrades installed over the past 14 years. The
plan contains seven Sustainability Principles that outline at both the industry
and site level the fundamental elements of sustainability—covering human
resources, finances, and maintenance. NNSA and Rosatom are now developing
a Joint Transition Plan, which will set forth estimated dates for completing the
transfer of sustainability activities to Russian control. This plan will identify sus

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