Text of the Report - p. 5

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johnkarls
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Text of the Report - p. 5

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Findings and Recommendations

Defense program seeks to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials by installing radiation detectors at international land
borders, seaports, and airports. Another program, the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative, is a worldwide effort to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites; it
also seeks to convert civilian research reactors worldwide from the use
of WMD-usable fuel to that which can be used only in reactors. In the
past several years, programs to engage nuclear scientists in civilian pursuits have been expanded to areas outside the former Soviet Union.
Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security Initiative (CSI), which now operates at 58 ports around the world,
is designed to prevent dangerous nuclear materials and technologies
from entering the United States. This program scans high-risk cargo
before it is loaded on U.S.-bound container ships. CSI has been criticized for its reliance on shipper-provided information to determine
which containers are “high-risk”; the program is supplemented by the
additional scanning of containers once they arrive in U.S. ports.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The new President should undertake a comprehensive review of cooperative nuclear security
programs, and should develop a global strategy that accounts for
the worldwide expansion of the threat and the restructuring of
our relationship with Russia from that of donor and recipient to
a cooperative partnership.

When cooperative nuclear security programs started well over 15
years ago, they focused on “loose nukes” and undersecured nuclear
materials in the former Soviet Union. More work remains in securing
Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which is spread over its 11 time zones. As former Senator Sam Nunn suggested in 2004, “We should offer to help
Russia consolidate their nuclear weapons in a few areas, and then
guard the heck out of them.”

But cooperative nuclear security programs have evolved to address
global threats as well. Terrorists seeking nuclear material will look
wherever that material may be poorly secured—in Russia or elsewhere.
There are currently well over 100 nuclear research reactors around the
world that use HEU for fuel, and many of them lack adequate security.
The November 2007 break-in by armed intruders at the Pelindaba

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nuclear research facility in South Africa illustrates the international
challenge.

Even as nuclear security programs have expanded into important
new areas, no strategic plan has been formulated to ensure maximum
effectiveness and coordination across different government agencies.
A new strategy is needed that takes into account developments since
September 11, 2001, including the fundamental changes in Russia’s
economy and in U.S. relations with Russia. Equally important, the
strategy should establish a basis for strengthening the international
consensus on working cooperatively to address nuclear proliferation
and terrorism.

The strategic review should examine every U.S. government program and activity, then recommend new, strengthened, or restructured
programs where warranted; programs that are less effective should be
eliminated or reduced. The review should identify where existing programs have helped stem the flow of potentially dangerous materials
and technology, as well as gaps in coverage. Finally, the review should
assess prospects for cooperative nuclear threat reduction activities in
specific countries where concerns or opportunities may exist, such as
Pakistan, India, North Korea, and China.

Washington should continue to work with Moscow to fulfill the
goals of current nuclear security programs in Russia and should extend
such programs to all vulnerable facilities. The Commission is concerned that Russia is not paying attention to developing an effective
nuclear security culture at all Russian facilities where nuclear material
is stored. The United States should propose to Russia an expansion of
nuclear security commitments that would secure nuclear materials at
all Russian facilities, including those storing nuclear weapons.

The United States should also press Russia to accelerate the blend-
down of HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons and explore ways to
expand its commitment beyond the 500 metric tons already agreed on.
Moreover, the process of converting civilian Russian research reactors
from using HEU to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) should be
intensified.

The Commission supports the efforts by the United States and
Russia to close Russia’s plutonium-producing reactors and calls on
both countries to finalize an agreement on disposing of plutonium in
excess of defense requirements.

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Findings and Recommendations

Finally, the Commission recommends that efforts to engage former
nuclear weapons scientists in peaceful research ventures in Russia and
the former Soviet republics continue and be guided by newly articulated priorities, such as focusing on nuclear institutes that are struggling
financially and could be vulnerable to recruitment efforts by terrorist
cells or proliferant states. The next administration should also assess the
potential of these programs to work not only with nuclear weapons scientists and engineers, but with individuals at nuclear facilities who may
have access to nuclear material. Although Russia’s economic revival has
helped mute some concerns regarding Russia’s nuclear institutes, the
fact remains that not all of these have benefited from this revival and
some require our continued attention.

Russia no longer wishes to be seen as a recipient of U.S. or international largesse. Moscow can now afford to allocate more resources to
cooperative security programs, to develop long-term plans, and to fund
those plans. Whenever possible, the two countries should work to
move nuclear security programs in Russia to a cost-sharing basis, a process that is already under way for some programs. Also, when possible,
the United States should work with Russia as a partner to advance the
objectives of threat reduction worldwide. Many U.S. threat reduction
programs involving Russia are currently being implemented as partnerships. For example, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative includes
trilateral programs—involving the United States, Russia, and the
IAEA—to convert research reactors worldwide from HEU to LEU
and repatriate the fuel back to Russia.

At the same time, U.S. cooperation with Russia should not be a
prerequisite for international efforts to strengthen nuclear security.
The United States should continue to work with international partners
through existing vehicles to strengthen their ability to counter nuclear
proliferation and combat nuclear terrorism.

The next administration must also think creatively about how to maximize the contributions of agencies other than the Departments of Defense,
Energy, and State to promote cooperative nuclear security objectives. Such
steps should include greater utilization of Department of Homeland Security and intelligence community assets. Also, greater coordination
between the Departments of Energy and Homeland Security to improve
radiation scanning devices at U.S. and international borders—and an
acceleration of Homeland Security efforts to build a global nuclear detec

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tion network—would enhance the ability of the United States to track
nuclear materials and prevent their movement across borders.

Country-Specific Challenges: Iran and North Korea

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is facing the prospect of an
unraveling that could be its permanent undoing. Iran and North Korea
have pursued nuclear weapons–related programs that the world cannot permit to succeed.

Iran’s apparent efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability in
defiance of its NPT obligations and UN Security Council resolutions
and the uncertainty over whether North Korea will ultimately eliminate
its nuclear weapons program constitute threats to international peace
and security. Failure to resolve these crises could lead some countries to
revisit their earlier decisions to renounce nuclear weapons, potentially
leading to a cascade of new nuclear-weapon states. Such a wave of
nuclear proliferation would seriously jeopardize the current world
order, creating profound new risks and increasing instability.

Iran maintains that it does not want to acquire nuclear weapons and
is merely pursuing “peaceful” nuclear activities as allowed under the
NPT. Although the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran issued in
November 2007 came to the controversial conclusion that Iran had
ended its nuclear weapons design and weaponization work in the fall of
2003, it made clear that Iran had engaged in such weaponization work
until then and continues to develop a range of technical capabilities,
including a civilian uranium enrichment program, that could be used to
produce nuclear weapons. If Iran should test a nuclear device or declare
it possesses a nuclear weapon, or if additional evidence should come to
light that conclusively revealed that Iran was making a nuclear weapon, it
would be the third time since 1991 that an NPT member evaded international nuclear inspectors, using the cover of peaceful nuclear activities
to either obtain, or come close to obtaining, a nuclear weapon.

If Iran should acquire a nuclear weapon in violation of its pledges
without suffering severe penalties, other countries might view it as a
model to follow—leading to a “cascade of proliferation,” as a UN panel
has warned. Several other countries, including Egypt, Algeria, Turkey,
Brazil, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Libya, South Korea, and Taiwan, have,
to varying degrees and at different times, expressed interest in acquiring

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Findings and Recommendations

nuclear weapons and are now planning on expanding their peaceful
nuclear energy programs.

The Commission decided that because of the dynamic international environment, it would not address the precise tactics that
should be employed by the next administration to achieve the strategic
objective of stopping the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and North
Korea. Developing those tactical initiatives will clearly be one of its
urgent priorities.

But on the central finding, the Commission was unanimous in concluding that the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea pose
immediate and urgent threats to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Successful nuclear programs in both countries could trigger a cascade
of proliferation and lead to the unraveling of the NPT.

Iran

For almost a decade, the United States has been concerned that Iran is
pursuing a nuclear weapons program through clandestine activities as
well as under the guise of peaceful enrichment for civilian nuclear
power. In 2002, a London-based Iranian opposition group—the
National Council of Resistance of Iran—added to such concerns by
disclosing details about a secret heavy-water production plant at Arak
and an underground enrichment facility at Natanz. Later that year, the
United States denounced Iranian violations of the NPT and IAEA
Safeguards agreement, accusing Iran of across-the-board pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction.

Three years later, the IAEA Board of Governors expressed an
“absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for
peaceful purposes.” In early 2006, the board voted to refer Iran as a
possible NPT violator to the UN Security Council; in December 2006,
the UN Security Council ordered Iran to suspend its enrichment effort
and adopted the first of three resolutions imposing sanctions to punish
Iran for continued defiance of the Security Council order. Tehran insists
that its enrichment program is intended only to provide fuel for nuclear
power reactors essential for meeting the nation’s peaceful energy needs.

As the United States was leading the effort in the UN Security
Council to end Iran’s enrichment efforts, the European Union (EU)
established a dual-track approach, supporting UN sanctions against
Iran while also offering Iran economic incentives to end its enrichment

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activities. The United States has not engaged in direct negotiation with
Tehran, but has worked closely with the EU regarding its incentives
effort. Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States
have held out the possibility of a package of political and economic
benefits if Tehran suspends its enrichment of uranium. To date, these
efforts to find a diplomatic solution have failed.

Most recently, on September 29, 2008, IAEA Director General
ElBaradei told his agency’s board of governors that Iran’s continued
enrichment activities are “still a cause for concern for the international
community in the absence of full clarity about Iran’s past and present
nuclear program.”

Just how much time does the world have to seek this “full clarity”
and decide what to do? Experts such as David Albright, of the Institute
for Science and International Security, have underscored that the
timeline for Iran’s acquisition of sufficient HEU to build a nuclear
bomb is ominously short—it ranges from only six months to two years.

North Korea

Serious concerns over North Korea’s efforts to possess nuclear weapons
have played a major role in U.S. foreign policy for more than 15 years.
In 1985, North Korea obtained a nuclear reactor from the Soviet
Union and signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. Seven years later the International Atomic Energy Agency
and North Korea finally reached agreement on a safeguards agreement
(required of all NPT non-nuclear-weapon states). As a result of inspections in late 1992, the IAEA identified significant discrepancies in
North Korea’s declaration and demanded that “special inspections” be
conducted at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. In response, Pyongyang
threatened to withdraw from the NPT, prompting the United States to
intervene to negotiate a resolution to the crisis. In 1994, the United
States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework under which
Pyongyang agreed to a denuclearized Korean peninsula in return for
political and economic concessions, including the construction of two
light-water nuclear power reactors.

In 2002, after having frozen North Korea’s existing plutonium-
based nuclear program, the Agreed Framework completely unraveled
after the United States confronted North Korean officials with information that their country was conducting a clandestine uranium-based

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Findings and Recommendations

nuclear weapons program in violation of the agreement. In an effort to
resolve the crisis, a Six-Party Talks forum was formed involving China,
Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
Despite a September 2005 declaration of agreement to denuclearize
the Korean peninsula, this Six-Party effort failed to prevent North
Korea from testing a nuclear weapon in October 2006—and declaring
itself a nuclear-weapons state. Nonetheless, renewed diplomatic
efforts, including direct talks between the United States and North
Korea, led to the Six-Party “Initial Actions” agreement with Pyongyang
in February 2007 on an overall road map for denuclearization.

The implementation of this agreement has been stop-and-go. But in
mid-October 2008, some progress was made on the verification issue; the
United States reciprocated by removing North Korea from its state sponsors of terrorism list. Future discussion will focus on the completeness of
North Korea’s declaration and the conclusion of a verification protocol.

RECOMMENDATION 5: As a top priority, the next administration must stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear
weapons programs. In the case of Iran, this requires the permanent cessation of all of Iran’s nuclear weapons–related efforts.
In the case of North Korea, this requires the complete abandonment and dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing
nuclear programs. If, as appears likely, the next administration
seeks to stop these programs through direct diplomatic engagement with the Iranian and North Korean governments, it must
do so from a position of strength, emphasizing both the benefits
to them of abandoning their nuclear weapons programs and the
enormous costs of failing to do so. Such engagement must be
backed by the credible threat of direct action in the event that
diplomacy fails.

In 2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change issued a blunt warning: “We are approaching a point at which the
erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and
result in a cascade of proliferation.” In the past four years Iran and North
Korea have made progress in their nuclear programs, and today the situation is even more urgent. We cannot, through global inaction, allow that
cascade of proliferation. It could doom populations the world over.

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Pakistan

The Intersection of Nuclear
Weapons and Terrorism


As I left government, the one piece of intelligence I heard that most

frightened me was that al Qaeda was rebuilding a safe haven in the

FATA.

—A former senior counterterrorism official

Pakistan is an ally, but there is a grave danger it could also be an unwitting source of a terrorist attack on the United States—possibly using
weapons of mass destruction. The Commission urges the next administration and Congress to pay particular attention to Pakistan, as it is the
geographic crossroads for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
Indeed, the border provinces of Pakistan today are a safe haven, if not
the safe haven, for al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda’s Afghan safe haven was critical to its ability to plan and
implement its attacks of September 11, 2001. Even then, Pakistan had
a role as a transit country for some of the hijackers. But now it has
become a key safe haven for al Qaeda, according to the most senior

U.S. intelligence official. In February 2008, Mike McConnell, the
Director of National Intelligence, testified to the House Intelligence
Committee: “The FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] serves
as a staging area for al Qaeda’s attacks in support of the Taliban in
Afghanistan as well as a location for training new terrorist operatives
for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United
States.” A year previously, his office had published a National Intelligence Estimate asserting that al Qaeda “has protected or regenerated
key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven
in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).” The
National Intelligence Estimate added that “al Qaeda will continue to
try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
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material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops
what it deems is sufficient capability.” Another senior intelligence official responsible for dealing with terrorism recently affirmed that al
Qaeda has strengthened its ties with Pakistani militants in the past
year, replenished its mid-level lieutenants, enjoys in the FATA many of
the benefits it enjoyed in Afghanistan before September 11, and remains
the most serious terrorist threat to the United States.

Indeed, a 2007 Foreign Policy Magazine poll of 117 nongovernmental terrorism experts found that 74 percent consider Pakistan the
country most likely to transfer nuclear technology to terrorists in the
next three to five years. Pakistan is a nuclear-weapon country; it gained
this status through the illicit work of a nationalist Islamic scientist,

A. Q. Khan. He was the father of Pakistan’s “Islamic bomb” and the
purveyor of sensitive nuclear technology across the Middle East and
Asia—to Libya, North Korea, and perhaps other countries. His network of business associates spanned the globe and is only now being
fully brought to justice. There may be other Pakistani scientists who
have been, or would be, willing to work with other countries or with
terrorists to help them acquire nuclear weapons.
According to open source estimates, today Pakistan has about 85
nuclear weapons, which are under the complete control of the Pakistani military. Though most U.S. and Pakistani officials assert that
these weapons and their components are safe from inside or outside
theft, the risk that radical Islamists—al Qaeda or Taliban—may gain
access to nuclear material is real. Should the Pakistani government
become weaker, and the Pakistani nuclear arsenal grow, that risk will
increase. With each new facility, military or civilian, comes added security concerns.

The reality is that Pakistan is steadily adding to its nuclear weapons
stockpile, which remains its chief deterrent against Indian attack. In
October 2008, on the heels of the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement,
China agreed to build two nuclear power plants in Pakistan. This
deal—especially if it does not contain mechanisms to prevent nuclear
material from being transferred from the new civilian plants to military
facilities—signals a nascent nuclear arms race in Asia.

The risk of a WMD attack being planned and executed from Pak

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Findings and Recommendations

istan’s northwest frontier area is growing, as that area continues to
function as a safe haven for al Qaeda.

RECOMMENDATION 6: The next President and Congress
should implement a comprehensive policy toward Pakistan that
works with Pakistan and other countries to (1) eliminate terrorist safe havens through military, economic, and diplomatic
means; (2) secure nuclear and biological materials in Pakistan;

(3) counter and defeat extremist ideology; and (4) constrain a
nascent nuclear arms race in Asia.
The President and Congress should develop and implement a
comprehensive policy involving all elements of national power—
military, economic, and diplomatic—to eliminate terrorist safe havens
in Pakistan. This policy should also be implemented with regard to
Afghanistan, India, China, and Russia.

ACTION: The United States should continue to support Pakistan’s efforts to eliminate al Qaeda’s safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP), through increased joint military
and intelligence operations. The United States should also
support Pakistan’s efforts to work with tribal leaders and to
strengthen the Frontier Corps and local police.

The United States should continue to provide Pakistan direct military support in the hunt to capture or kill al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist
leaders. The United States, with other countries, should also provide
funding and training to the Pakistani military, as well as to the Frontier
Corps and other local and provincial security forces. Where possible,
any operations should be executed by Pakistani forces; the U.S. military footprint in Pakistan should remain minimal.

Allowing the Pakistani armed forces to lead the fight, supported by
the United States, other North Atlantic Treaty Organization members,
and other friendly countries, avoids further arousing Pakistani nationalism and anti-Americanism. Minimizing direct U.S. involvement lessens
the opportunity for nationalist outcry and may allow a more rational
assessment of the situation. The Pakistani government, military, and

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people need to understand that their interests are also at stake—an
unfortunate reality driven home by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto
and by the September 2008 attack against the Islamabad Marriott. Al
Qaeda and radical militants pose a threat to Pakistan’s democratic government, institutions, and people. Ultimately, the only way for a democratic Pakistan to truly take on al Qaeda and other terrorists is for all
elements of the society to recognize them as a threat not just to the
United States or Europe but also to Pakistan itself.

ACTION: The new U.S. policy toward Pakistan should include
economic assistance that helps Pakistan improve the services it
provides to its people and create greater opportunities for education and commerce, especially in the FATA.

The focus of U.S. policy should be to help Pakistan achieve political and economic stability. Current U.S. assistance to Pakistan reflects
the decision to make tactical, near-term military and security concerns
a priority over long-term efforts to bolster Pakistan’s democracy and its
prospects for economic development. Over the past six years, the
United States supported Pakistan with a mix of military, security, economic, and social aid, totaling $12 billion. Of that total, $8.9 billion (74
percent) was devoted to security and military assistance, and only $3.1
billion (26 percent) went to social and economic programs.

Yet festering economic and social ills in Pakistan have created a hospitable environment for radicalization, and the trends indicate that the
challenge is growing. Pakistan’s population is projected to double to
nearly 300 million people by 2050, making it the world’s fifth most populous country. Over the next decade, food, water, and energy are likely to
become scarcer. The UN Development Program’s Human Development
Report of 2005 gave Pakistan the lowest score for its education index of
any country outside of Africa. Pakistan’s overall literacy rate hovers
between 40 and 50 percent. For women, the literacy rate is below 30 percent—and for women in the FATA, it is only 3 percent. Because teachers
are poorly trained, Pakistanis are turning away from public education to
attend private schools and madrassas, most of which offer religious
instruction rather than preparing youth to enter professions or trades.

The Commission supports the type of assistance proposed in legislation sponsored by Senators Joseph Biden and Richard Lugar in July

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2008—S. 3263, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008.
This bill was envisioned as a “democratic dividend” to the democratically
elected post-Musharraf government, and if passed it will provide a down
payment on democracy and security. In a statement accompanying the
legislation, the lawmakers asserted: “The purpose and intent of this legislation is to help transform the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan from a transactional, tactically-driven set of short-term exercises in
crisis-management, into a deeper, broader, long-term strategic engagement.” The bill authorizes $1.5 billion annually for five years for nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan—more than triple the current funding.

Any U.S. assistance should be designed to reach local leaders and
entities as directly as possible, in order to strengthen civil society.
Emphasis should be placed on developing infrastructure in border
provinces: hospitals, roads, power plants, and schools (with teachers
who are well trained). Such investments in physical infrastructure
are easy to measure and monitor. They also provide opportunities to
enhance cross-border trade, promote tourist corridors, and encourage
specific businesses, such as selling electricity.

Such opportunities result in both economic development and confidence building between Pakistan and its neighbors. In addition, they
symbolically demonstrate the commitment of the United States to the
people of Pakistan. The cumulative effect of this new strategy for U.S.
development and economic assistance would be to help the Pakistani
people, foster their government’s ability to provide services and effective governance at all levels and in all parts of the country, and, ultimately, provide the antidote to terrorist safe havens and a bulwark
against radicalization.

If the United States does not change the emphasis of its assistance,
Senators Biden and Lugar said in their joint statement, “there is little
likelihood of drying up popular tolerance for anti-U.S. terrorist groups,
or persuading any Pakistani regime to devote the political capital necessary to deny such groups sanctuary and covert material support.”

ACTION: The new U.S. strategy toward Pakistan should
involve the use of all elements of national power—including
those of so-called soft power, such as public diplomacy, strategic communications, and development assistance—to counter
violent extremist anti-Americanism, create a universal culture

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of revulsion against the use of WMD, and lower the demand

for WMD by terrorists.

The U.S. objective should be not only to address the underlying
social, economic, and educational conditions that give rise to violent
extremism and terrorism but also to use all means to counter the messages of terrorists. By addressing the basic needs of the Pakistani people
and letting them know that the United States is not solely interested in
supporting Pakistan’s military, this new approach will demonstrate U.S.
commitment to the people of Pakistan. If accompanied by effective
public diplomacy, it can help foster a climate in which the democratic
Pakistani government will be able to work with the United States in a
stronger partnership, one based on mutual concern for the Pakistani
people. The potential benefits of U.S. assistance were illustrated
recently, albeit briefly, in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake
in Pakistan, when the United States provided over half a billion dollars
in relief. The terrorists tried to compete, but the U.S. assistance was so
large-scale and visible that Pakistanis began giving out small toy Chinook helicopters—the main purveyors of the food, blankets, and medicine. In return, the United States received a great deal of Pakistani
goodwill.

Shifting the U.S. message and support from emphasizing the military
to stressing development assistance and support to the institutions of Pakistani government will demonstrate that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is
founded on more than the war on terror. If U.S. public diplomacy succeeds in countering radical Islamist anti-American ideas in the mosques
and coffee shops in Pakistan, then there is a chance that the United States
can erode tacit or explicit support for terrorists who espouse mass violence, including the use of weapons of mass destruction.

We emphasize that it is not enough for leaders at the highest levels
to understand the importance of tools of soft power and decide to use
them. They must also develop the organic capability to deploy those
tools where and when needed around the world—including, in the first
instance, in Pakistan. In the section below titled “Government Organization and Culture,” we outline what such an organic capability entails
and recommend the steps necessary to reorganize the civilian foreign
policy agencies in much the same way as the military and the intelligence communities have been restructured.

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Findings and Recommendations

ACTION: The President must make securing biological and
nuclear materials and weapons in Pakistan a priority. Congress
should ensure that sufficient funding is authorized and appropriated for this purpose, and other countries such as Russia
and China should be enlisted to contribute to this effort.

Providing assistance to Pakistan to ensure that its nuclear facilities
are secure from theft or any diversion of materials, weapons, or expertise is a vital security interest for the United States and for the international community. Therefore, the new U.S. strategy for Pakistan
must emphasize working with the Pakistani military and with Pakistani
and other foreign intelligence services to make certain that all threats
to Pakistan’s facilities can be minimized, anticipated, and countered.

Moreover, Pakistan has biological research laboratories that possess stocks of dangerous pathogens, some of which may not be adequately secured. The United States is currently funding efforts to
improve physical security and access control at such facilities. This support should continue until Pakistan has sufficiently reduced the potential danger of theft or accidents.

Several Russian officials with whom the Commission met in
Moscow in September 2008 indicated that they supported working
with the United States to help the Pakistani government maintain and
improve the security of its nuclear arsenal. The executive director of a
Russian nongovernmental organization focused on nonproliferation
asserted that the most urgent need for bilateral cooperation directed at
other countries concerned Pakistan, not Iran. This expert added that
working with Pakistan “could be the leading subject of nonproliferation cooperation” between the United States and Russia.

Such an international effort could have the added benefit of supporting the creation of a consensus among countries that do not now
recognize the risks posed by WMD proliferation and terrorism. It
could focus their attention on biological and nuclear security, proliferation networks, and international terrorism.

ACTION: The United States should work with Pakistan,

India, China, Russia, and other countries to constrain the nas

cent arms race in Asia and to reduce tension and promote

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greater stability in that region. As part of this effort, the
United States should encourage cross-border activities, such
as people-to-people exchanges, transportation, trade, and economic investment.

The President must engage India and Afghanistan to foster a common understanding that Pakistani stability and progress are in their
own interest and in the best interests of South Asia generally. In particular, Pakistan’s deeply adversarial relationship with India so consumes
strategic thinking in Pakistan that little attention is paid to such concerns as counterterrorism and nonproliferation. Easing tension between
the two nations should give Pakistan the space to recognize its stake in
addressing these issues.

The United States should work with Russia to engage Pakistan,
India, and China in a regional approach to nuclear security and counter-
proliferation. Priority should be assigned to precluding the use of nuclear
weapons during a future crisis, further securing nuclear materials, limiting the expansion and modernization of nuclear forces, continuing the
current nuclear testing moratorium, precluding onward proliferation to
the Middle East, and limiting the deployment of short-range nuclear
delivery systems. At the same time, U.S.-Indian cooperation in the civilian nuclear power industry must not be allowed to become the catalyst of
a nuclear arms race in Asia. U.S. policy must seek to counter the destabilizing aspects of Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear modernization
and address the root causes of insecurity that fuel proliferation.

An existential fear of India is the main preoccupation of the Pakistani military. Pakistan’s nuclear modernization is driven both by
India’s conventional modernization and by the prospect of India’s
nuclear expansion. India’s nuclear and conventional modernization, in
turn, is driven by fears of China and Pakistan.

Pakistan believes that it is surrounded by security threats—and

U.S. cooperation with India in defense and strategic technology sharing has exacerbated this perception. Multiple sources of instability in
South Asia dilute the ability of the Pakistani government to focus on
any one specific security issue, thereby allowing all of them to worsen.
If Pakistani leaders are preoccupied with threats from India’s nuclear
forces and the insurgency in Kashmir, then their cooperation with the
United States on issues of concern to the United States will be limited.
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Findings and Recommendations

The United States should build confidence in Pakistan through its
Afghanistan policy. That policy should aim to stabilize Afghanistan by
ridding it of the Taliban and allied extremists, build stability in border
provinces such as Baluchistan, and assure Pakistan that U.S. policy
toward Afghanistan will not result in collaboration between India and
Afghanistan at Pakistan’s expense. Al Qaeda recognizes the value of
exploiting Pakistan’s concern with both India and Afghanistan.

If the Pakistani government could be reassured about its own
external security, it could focus more attention on internal elements
such as governance, civic services, and the need to counter radicalization. To achieve this goal, the United States must display greater transparency in its diplomatic exchanges with Pakistan, including its
clarification of the U.S.–India civil nuclear deal. And it must also persuade Islamabad that U.S. assistance to India is not a direct threat to
Pakistan’s strategic security.

Finally, the United States should discreetly encourage a return
to a back-channel dialogue between India and Pakistan, supported by
confidence-building measures. As discussed in the next section, working with Russia could be an effective way to pursue such measures. This
effort should be part of a broader regional strategy to help ensure that
disputes and instability in Kashmir and Pakistan–Afghanistan border
provinces do not become flashpoints that destabilize regional security.

°°°
It is possible for the situation in Pakistan to take a more positive turn.
After the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari declared that the war on terrorism “is our war.”
Parliamentarians are being briefed on the terrorist threats and on Pakistani military operations in the border regions. Tribal leaders are organizing against foreign al Qaeda elements in the FATA and NWFP.
Suicide bombing has been declared illegitimate by Muslim scholars of
all major schools of thought in Pakistan. Relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan appear to be improving, and negotiations
may help separate the committed terrorists from those who have legitimate grievances against their governments.

Nevertheless, there is no graver threat to U.S. national security
than a WMD in the hands of terrorists. Trends in South Asia, if left
unchecked, will increase the odds that al Qaeda will successfully

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Pakistan

develop and use a nuclear device or biological weapon against the
United States or its allies. The reality behind the 9/11 Commission’s
comment that “it is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the
struggle against Islamist terrorism” is obvious. The difference today is
that the situation is urgent.

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Russia and the United States

There can be no coherent, effective security strategy to reduce

nuclear dangers that does not take into account Russia—its strengths,

weaknesses, aims, and ambitions.

—Senator Sam Nunn

Since 1991, the United States and Russia have had a shared commitment to reducing nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both nations. The
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by the United
States and the Soviet Union in July 1991, was the first strategic arms
control treaty to actually call for a reduction in the number of nuclear
warheads deployed by the two parties.

One of the most difficult issues facing the new administration will
be relations with Russia. It is safe to say that over the past decade the
post-Soviet promise of a democratic Russia has not materialized, and
concerns about how Russia is exercising its interests in eastern Europe
and the states of the former Soviet Union are increasing.

As Washington and Moscow struggle to resolve their foreign policy
differences, preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism remains a
critical shared interest. Both countries acknowledged this common
aim as recently as April 2008, when they agreed to the U.S.–Russia
Strategic Framework Declaration. Despite serious differences on
many foreign policy issues, the two sides agreed on a Joint Framework
for their relationship that emphasizes strategic arms, nuclear nonproliferation, and the fight against global terrorism. It is remarkable that
during a tense period, the United States and Russia could come
together to chart a new relationship. Their Joint Framework provides a
basis for moving forward on many of the recommendations of this
Commission.

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Russia and the United States

Biological Cooperative Threat Reduction

At its peak, the illicit biological weapons program of the Soviet Union
employed an estimated 50,000 scientists and technicians. After the
Soviet breakup in 1991, the United States launched a major effort to
prevent this dangerous expertise from migrating to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The United States sought to find civilian employment for former Soviet bioweapons scientists. In recent years, however,
the United States has reluctantly cut back its biological cooperative
threat reduction (CTR) activities in Russia because of Moscow’s
bureaucratic and political obstacles. Increasingly, the Russian government has viewed biological CTR programs with disinterest and even
suspicion, arguing that its growing economic strength obviates the need
for continued foreign assistance. Yet despite these assertions, Russia’s
former bioweapons scientists and inadequately secured collections of
highly dangerous pathogens remain a global proliferation concern.

Nuclear Security Initiatives

The 2005 Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative contained a comprehensive joint action plan for cooperation on security upgrades that accelerated security upgrades, performed in Russia by U.S. officials, of nuclear
weapons and material sites. It also included specific benchmarks and
timelines for upgrades of the nuclear sites controlled by the Federal
Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) and the Ministry of Defense. Since
the signing of the Bratislava Initiative, additional sites have been added
to the Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program; work there
is to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2010. More needs to be done,
however; in particular, both the focus on Russian civil nuclear facilities
and the pace at which they are secured must be increased. The
Bratislava Initiative is a successful model for bolstering efforts to cover
additional nuclear sites in Russia, and the United States may seek to follow it in addressing the remaining military and civilian sites.

While security upgrades for sensitive Russian nuclear facilities have
expanded and accelerated under the Bratislava Initiative, senior Russian officials have not paid sufficient attention to their need to sustain
these upgrades after the U.S. programs come to a close. The National
Defense Authorization Act of 2003 mandates that a sustainable material
security system be transferred to the exclusive support and manage

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Findings and Recommendations

ment of the Russian Federation no later than January 1, 2013. The current Joint Sustainability Plan identifies the requirements for Rosatom to
sustain the improvements made possible by U.S.-provided assistance,
and the two sides are working on an implementation plan. But to date,
the Russian government has not shared with Washington its plans to
fund sustainment of the security upgrades. More needs to be done to
secure a Russian commitment to increase funding for these efforts.

Strategic Nuclear Arms

When the Soviet Union broke apart in December 1991, some of the
nuclear weapons covered by START were located in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. After a series of U.S. initiatives and offers, these
nations agreed to eliminate all of their nuclear weapons during the
seven-year reduction period outlined in START I and to join the Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states. The treaty limits
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers on the territories of the parties and imposes a complex verification regime.

All the nuclear warheads located in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and
Belarus were returned to Russia for elimination. The United States and
Russia completed the reductions in their forces by the designated date
in December 2001. START will expire in December 2009 unless the
parties agree to extend it. The United States and Russia have indicated
that although they do not support extension of START as a whole, they
are interested in extending some of the treaty’s verification provisions.
According to the treaty, the parties must begin discussions about the
future of the treaty one year prior to its expiration. Senior-level discussions between the United States and Russia began more than a year
ago, but basic questions, such as which START transparency provisions
should be extended, have not been resolved.

The United States and Russia committed to further reductions in
their strategic nuclear arms in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.
This pact, referred to as the Moscow Treaty, was signed in May 2002 and
entered into force in June 2003. It has two basic requirements: (1) that
the United States and Russia reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to
between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by the treaty’s expiration date of
December 31, 2012, and (2) that both parties meet at least twice annually in a Bilateral Implementation Commission established by the treaty

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